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THE DYNAMICS OF YUGOSLAV RELIGIOUS POLICY: 
SOME INSIGHTS FROM ORGANIZATION THEORY* 
by Pedro Ramet 
Pedro Ramet, a native of London , England , completed his 
undergraduate studies in philosophy at Stanford University, 
earned his master 's degree in international relations 
through the University of Arkansas , and received his Ph. D. 
in political science in 1981 from UCLA. He is the author of 
Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1963-1983 ( Indiana 
University Press , 1 984) and Cross Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union (Indiana University Press , forthcoming),  and 
editor of Religion ·and Nationalism in Soviet and East Euro­
pean Politics ( Duke University Press, 1984) and Yugoslavia 
in the 1980s (Westview Press, 1985). This essay was origi­
nally published as a chapter in the last mentioned book, and 
appears here by permission of the author and of Westview 
Press . 
In approaching the subject of religious policy, there are several 
questions with which one is confronted. First , should religious 
policy be treated as an autonomous issue area in isolation from other 
issue areas, or should it be interpreted with attention to a purported 
organic relationship with other issue areas , such as nationalities 
policy , educational policy , foreign policy , and so forth ? Second, 
should policy in general, and religious policy in specific, be seen as 
the r�sult of a factionalized environment or as the product of a 
system in which internal conflicts are of no policy importance ? 
Third, should policy be seen as the product of clear objectives or as 
a complex outcome of sundry variables? Fourth, does the policy of a 
given organization, in this case the League of Communists of Yugo­
slavia (LCY), tend toward consistency or inconsistency over time and 
space ? And fifth, is religious policy (in Yugoslavia) best viewed as 
an output of the system as a whole or in terms of the separate policy­
m�king of the system's federal sub-units? In the following pages, I 
shall argue that Yugoslav religious policy is better understo od in 
, terms of the complex side of these alternatives and that , in this 
regard , it is a typical Yugoslav policy sphere. I shall also argue 
that organization theory can be useful to highlight some structural 
and behavioral facets of Yugoslav religious policy. 
Organization theory is concerned, among other things, with elabo­
rating the environment in which decisions are made and policies car­
ried out. It assumes the necessity of some principle of hierarchy and 
of a division of labor, and a purposiveness in organizational beha­
vior. 1 Some of the insights gained from organization theory are , I 
2 
3 
believe, helpful in understanding the dynamics of Yugoslav religious 
policy-making. At the same time, the evidence from the Yugoslav case 
is germane �o an assessment of the relative appli�ability of alternate 
. ' ' 
theories of organization. 
Fred Luthans outlines fou� distinct approaches in. organization 
theory. 2 Classical bureaucratic theory, which may be associated with 
Max Weber , Peter M. Blau , and Robert Michels, presents a mechanical 
model of bureaucracy, in which the tendency to oligarchy is sometimes 
seen as irresistible.3 Behavioral theory , which may be associated 
with James G. March, Herbert A. Simon, and Philip Selznick, stresses 
the role of people , their perceptions and motivations , in organiza­
tional behavior and policy-making.4 Behavioral theory stresses or­
ganizational structure in both its formal and informal aspects. Sys­
tems theory stresses the input-output aspect of organizational beha­
vior, as well as the interrelatedness and interdependence of elements 
in the whole. Systems theory is concerned, then, with identifying the 
"strategic" points in the system, the "nature of their mutual depen­
dency," the processes which link the system together, and the goals of 
the system as a whole.5 And finally, contingency theory, which may be 
associated with Joan Woodward, William L. Zwerman, Paul L. Lawrence , 
and Jay w. Lorsch, urges that environmental factors such as, speci­
fically, technology, may be more important than organizational struc­
ture and processes for organizational output. The findings o·f Law­
rence and Lorsch may be summarized as follows: 
1. If the environment is uncertain and heterogeneous, then the 
organization should be relatively unstructured. • • • 
2. If the environment is stable and homogeneous ,  then a rigid 
organization structure is appropriate. 
3. If the external environment is very diverse and the internal 
environment is highly differentiated , then there must be very 
elaborate integrating mechanisms in that organization structure.6 
While all of these theories have something to offer, the b ehavioral 
variant seems especially well suited to the Yugoslav case, and most of 
the citations from organization theory, in what follows, come from 
behavioralists. 
The Institutional Setting 
The regime's relations with religious b odies are conducted 
through two parallel structures. On the one hand , there are the 
republican Offices for Relations with Religious Communities, which are 
nominally subordinate to the Federal Office for Relations with Reli­
gious Communities, but which are, like almost everything in Yugosla­
via, actually run by the respective republic governments. Alongsi�e 
these offices are similar ones established under the rubric of �he 
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Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (SAWPY) and its 
republic branches. These are separately staffed, but j udging from 
their activity and from the frequency of mention in the press , it 
seems clear that the governmental offices play a more important role 
in the day-to-day management of Church-state relations. 
In form, this has the appearance of hierarchical subordination. 
In practice, each republic has its own separate legislation regarding 
religion, which differs in particulars �rom republic to republic, 7 and 
hence the guidelines, under which each republican Office for Relations 
with Religious Communities operates, differ. 
While the party itself has , technically speaking� n o  formal 
apparatus for coordinating its religious policy , it exerts its in­
fluence indirectly through the aforementioned agencies and also 
through the press, · which has often served as the vehicle for express­
ing party views on the sub ject of religion. And finally, the Marxist 
intellectual community , most especially sociologists concerned with 
religion, contribute to the understanding of religion in Yugoslavia 
and thus to defining the contours of religious policy in that country. 
Add to this federalization the confessional heterogeneity in the 
country and one arrives at a strong expectation that religious policy 
will have distinct differences from one republic to the next. This 
expectation seems to be borne out by the evidence. 
In Macedonia and Slovenia , Church-state relations are cordial , 
and in Macedonia one may even speak of a certain warmth in the rela­
tionship. Indeed, the regime was strongly supportive of the creation 
of an autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church in 1967, seeing in this 
ecclesiastical structure an instrument in its polemic with Bulgaria 
over the ethnicity of the Macedonians. In the Slovenian instance , 
although Catholic clergy there have occasionally spoken out on human 
rights issues and on the sub j ect of "atheization" in the scho ols , on 
the whole Church-state relations are relatively uncomplicated. 
The situations in these two republics are comparable in another 
respect, viz., the relative absence of factionalization on either side 
of the equation. The Macedonian political elite has every reason to 
support the Macedonian Orthodox Church , since b oth are wary of Bul- · 
garian pretensions (Bulgaria asserts that Macedonians are merely Bul­
garians) ,  and there is no evidence of any division within the Mace­
danian political elite on the subject of religious policy. Similarly, 
the Macedonian Orthodox Church, finding its au.tocephaly repudiated by 
the Serbian Orthodox Church, 8 looks to the republican government for 
support; none of the Macedonian clergy have lleen involved, thus, in 
politically controversial activities. 
Factionalization is also absent, as mentioned, in Slovenia. The 
Slovenian party organization is dominated b y  "liberals" and it has 
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been years since there have been reports of any anti-Church directives 
in that republic. And while the same cannot be said of the Catholic 
Church--the only religious organization that counts for anything in 
Slovenia--its '�rogressiv�' wing, represented in Slovenia largely by · 
Bishop Vekoslav Grmic, 9 is of no particular significance. In Slo­
venia , as in Macedonia , thus , there are strong sources of impetus 
toward cooperation, and Church-state relations in these republics are 
organizationally simpler. 
The Macedonian Orthodox Church is not the only religious organi­
zation in whose prosperity the LCY has had a vested interest. A 
flourishing Islamic community i� important to the regime both because 
the regime has wanted to stimulate a Muslim ethnic consciousness among 
Bosnian Muslims and because of the importance which Yugoslavia places 
on its ties with the Arab world. In recent years, ho�ever, there have 
been repeated symptoms of rising Muslim assertiveness, including calls 
for a Muslim cultural society (which the regime will not allow), and 
demands for the redesignation of Bosnia as a "Muslim Republic," which 
is likewise unacceptable, since Muslims account for only r:oughly 40 
percent of Bosnia's population. As a result of this new Muslim asser­
tiveness , however , the Bosnian party's policy vis-a-vis the Islamic 
community has become tinged with ambivalence.10 
In fact , Church-state relations are generally more complex in 
Bosnia , as they are also in Croatia and Serbia. This is a result pf 
the greater complexity of issues, the Serb-Croat rivalry in the former 
two republics (producing a generally higher level of tension iQ inter� 
ethnic and thus in interconfessional relations),  and the great�r 
degree of factionalization both within the political elites and within 
the respective religious bodies. The first two issues are inter­
related, for it is the greater ethnic and confessional heterogeneity 
which , in part , accounts for the greater complexity of issues. The 
political elites here, unlike those in Slovenia and Macedonia, repeat­
edly return to the theme of "clerico-nationalism , "  warning the 
Churches to steer clear of nationalist causes. 1 1  There are also 
specific features that distinguish one republic from the other: in 
Croatia, there is the traditional rivalry between the archbishops of 
Zagreb and Split , as well as the presence of theologically liberal 
clergy in the Christianity Today organization. In Bosnia, the Fran­
ciscan presence adds a complicating variable to the equation; and in 
Serbia, the institutional weakness of the Serbian Orthodox Church has 
meant that it has been less capable than the C�tholic Church of mount­
ing effective challenges to regime policies. And where factionaliza­
tion is concerned , there have been tension$, in these republics , 
between theological liberals and theological conservatives in the 
Catholic Church , b etween Franciscans and diocesans again in the 
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Catholic Church, between lower clergy and hierarchy in the Serbian 
Orthodox Church, and between "liberals" (in different senses) and 
"conservatives" where the political elites are concerned.12 
In the other federal units, finally, Church-state issues are less 
salient, even though the press has occasionally accused both Muslims 
and Orthodox in Kosovo of "meddling" in nationalism. Voj vodina is 
distinct in being the only federal unit with a large number of active 
Protestant churches. In Voj vodina , as in Montenegro,  Church-state 
relations are distinctly low key. 
Overall, thus, institutional decentralization and the federaliza­
tion of policy-making have resulted in the emergence of discrete 
policy arenas. The distinct concerns and differences in factionaliza­
tion assure that religious policy will vary from republic to republic. 
Behavioral-organization theory tells us that decentralization, 
such as that found in Yugoslavia, 
results in departmentalization and an increase in the bifur­
cation of interests among the sub-units in the organization. 
The maintenance needs of the subunits dictate a commitment 
to the subunit goals over and ffove their contribution to 
the total organization program. 
Bifurcation of interests is also reinforced by differences in the 
training and experience of administrators in different republics. 
Given local environmental differences, March and Simon inform. us, 
the struggle for internal control not only affects directly 
the content of decisions, but also causes greater elabora­
tion of sub-unit ideologies. Each subunit seeks success by 
fitting its policy into the official doctrine of the large 
organization to legitimize its demands. Such a tactic in­
creases the intfinalization of subgoals by participants 
within subunits. · 
This tactic also obscures the differences between policies of the 
federal sub-units , since each sub-unit presents its own policy , of 
necessiiy, as consistent with the overall policy of the orgatilzation, 
in this case the LCY. The resulting pattern is reflected in Figure 7-
1 ,  which is a modified version of a model originally devised by 
Selznick. 
Religious Developments in Croatia and Bosnia 
The recent Church-state frictions in Yugoslavia are a case in 
point and bear out the relevance of organization theory. For within 
the federalized Yugoslav context, these frictions have been localized 
rather than a feature of nationwide developments. In fact , it is 
chiefly in Bosnia and Croatia that there have been prolonged polemics 
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over religious conditions and religious activity. Where Croatia is 
concerned, the party's nervousness in the early months following 
Tito's death was quickened by Archbishop Kuharic's outspoken demands 
for an expansion of ecclesiastical prerogatives (e.g., in terms of 
access to army recruits and to prisoners), and by 1981 ,  the atmosphere 
in the regime's relationship with the Catholic Church was soured by 
mutual distrust, reciprocal polemics, and periodic "corrections" which 
served, inter alia, to sustain the polemics. When the theologically 
liberal Christianity Today publishing house ran afoul of certain 
b ishops in 1 9 81 ,  the regime quickly endorsed the Christianity Today 
clergy--in a move that was interpreted on the Church's side as unwar­
ranted interference and that probably was, if anything, embarrassing 
to the clergy of Christianity Today. 
Yet despite repeated reports of petty harassments of Catholic 
clergy in Croatia, 16 LCC policy in the sphere of religion remains the 
outcome of factional politics. In a striking example of this, Nenad 
Ivankovic, longtime specialist on religious affairs for the Zagreb 
newspaper, Vjesnik, and spokesman for more moderate elements in the 
establishment , defended Popes Pius XII and John Paul II , in 1 9 82 ,  
after their public disparagement by former Croatian Assembly President 
Jakov Blazevie.l7 
The regime press sometimes charges individual priests with having 
Ustase sympathies and with singing old Ustase songs. It appears that 
these accusations are not always accurate. What they accomplish, 
however, is to foster the idea that ecclesiastical involvement in 
nationalism is apt to be fascistic. The liberal Croatian theologian, 
v I Fr. Tomislav Sagi-Bunic , recently replied to such equations in an 
extended discourse on The Catholic Church and the Croatian People. 
Re j ecting any notion that the Church is entitled to identify itself 
h V I wit the Croatian nation, Sagi-Bunic proceeded to distinguish between 
''healthy nationalism" (or "patriotism") and "unhealthy nationalism , "  
and defended the Catholic Church's "care" for the language , culture , 
history, and welfare of the Croatian community.18 While the book was 
well received in the regime press, Croatian nationalism remains a 
delicate sub-theme in relations between the party and the Catholic 
Church. 
While the religious scene in Slovenia , Macedonia , and arguably 
Croatia too, has been unshaken by any dramatic new developments in the 
1 980s , the same cannot be said for Bosnia-Herzegovina , where two 
distinct events have dramatically heightened the religious self-aware­
ness of Catholics and Muslims. 
The first of these was the alleged appearance of the Madonna, on 
June 24,  1 9 81 ,  to six Herzegovinan children (fo� the first time) in 
the village of Medj ugor j e  in the district of ditluk. The regi�e 
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initially blamed Franciscan Father Jozo Zovko for concocting the 
miracle and put him in prison on a three-and-a-half year sentence , 
charging him with manipulating the believers in the interest of fo­
menting Croatian secessionism and anticommunism. 1 9  The LC Bosnia­
Herzegovina was worried that the steady stream of pilgrims to M_ed­
j ugor j e ,  which soon began to flow (at the rate of 6 , 000- 1 0, 000 per 
day), would stimulate Croatian nationalism and complicate interconfes­
si6nal relations in the republic. Yet while the party was trying to 
debunk the alleged miracle , the Church itself remained cautious , 
appointing an investigatory commission to study the miracle and pass 
j udgment on it. 
Meanwhile, the children continue to report almost daily visita­
tions by the Madonna, who, they say, has confided various "secrets" to 
them.20 Pilgrims and tourists continue to come to Medjugorje, includ­
ing many from abroad , and some 25 , 000-26 , 000 people took part in 
third-anniversary masses in Medj ugor j e  in June 1 9 84. By then the . 
authorities were starting to see the phenomenon in a new light and 
began to talk of developing hotels and other touristic facilities in 
the area in order to attract hard currency from foreign visitors. As 
of mid- 1 9 85 ,  the chief frictions produced by the miracle seem to be 
intra-Church (between the diocesan Bishop of Mostar, who disputes the 
authenticity of the miracle, and the Franciscans, who benefit from it 
and endorse it), rather than between Church and regime.21 
In the case of the Muslims, on the other hand , it has been much 
harder to draw the line between what is religious and what is nation­
alist , and correspondingly harder to persuade the Muslim clergy to 
restrict themselves to "purely religious" functions. It is this 
complication , above all, that accounts for the sharp ambivalence in 
religious policy in Bosnia, where the Muslims are able to build 
mosques without any problem--there were 2, 037 in Yugoslavia as a whole 
in 1 9 76 , 22 and many more have been constructed since then--opened a 
new theological faculty in 1977, and launched a new theological jour­
nal, Islamska misao, in 1979. The regime has even allowed theological 
students to study in the Middle E�st. In essence , thus, the party has 
been broadly tolerant of Islam. 
At the same time , the regime h�s shuddered at any hint of pan­
Islam or Muslim nationalism. _As Zagreb Professor Milan Kangrga put it 
in 1982, 
the danger of Islam lies not in itself, as such, but rather 
in the tendencies contained within it, which do not shrink 
from openly and militantly advocating that Marx's science 
(which is European par excellence) be replaced by the Is-
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lamic religion and the Koranic way of life.23 
And this was, in fact , tQ.e charge later levellc:�d against a gr�mp ,of 
thirteen "Muslim nationalists" tried in Sarajevo in summer 1983. The 
leading defendants--Om�r Mustafa Behmens and Alia �ustafa Izetbego­
vic--were given jail sentences of fifteen and fourteen years respect­
ively, while most of the others received sentences of between five and 
ten years in duration. They were said to have made a visit "of an 
exclusively inimical character" to an unnamed Islamic country, to have 
propagated an " Islamic Declaration" which called for the "purifica­
tio�' of Bosnia, and to have begun organizing for the establishment of 
an "Islamistan" in Bosnia.24 The trial attracted a great deal of 
foreign attention, including in the Middle East, but did not have any 
particular consequences for the practice of Islam in Yugoslavia� 
except to stimulate Muslim self-awareness, at least temporarily. 
Basic vs. Routine Decisions ------- ---- ���� ����� 
Within the federalized, factionalized context of Yugoslav policy-
making, religious policy must be attuned to diverse factors, including 
the need to maintain a good image in the West (the source of tourists 
and credits), the desirability of avoiding offense to Middle Eastern 
countries , 25 the importance of maintaining the loyalty of Orthodox 
Macedonians in the face of Bulgarian claims, the fear that religious 
organizations may adopt the role of spokesmen of national communities, 
and so forth. At the same time, as I have indicated in the foregoing 
pages, the "rational actor model"26 is largely irrelevant to under­
standing religious policy in Yugoslavia. On the contrary, religious 
policy can be better interpreted as the variegated outcome of pre­
established procedures and routines, conflicting interests and views, 
accidents of policy sequence, and strategies of "satisficing."27 Her­
bert A. Simon once put it this way: 
Discussions .of administrative centralization and decentrali­
zation often bog down on the question: "Who really makes 
the decisions [in an organization] ? "  Such a question is 
meaningless--a complex [policy] is like a great river, draw­
ing from its many tributaries the innumerable component 
premises of which it is constituted.28 
The formulation of religious policy in Yugoslavia is thus fully conso­
nant with the expectations engendered by organization theory. 
Yet it is clear also that the LCY (or Tito personally) has inter­
vened at different junctures, especially prior to 1980, to set forth 
certain fundamental principles. A recent instance involved the case 
of a Marija Car of Duga Resa who was expelled from the party in July 
1983 because she allowed her newborn child to be baptized in church. 
I 
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Although not a believer herself, she consented to the baptism at the 
insistence of her husband. She appealed her expulsion to the Commis­
sion for Statutory Problems of the LCY , thus bringing the central 
party apparatus into the dispute.29 The Statutory Commission upheld 
her expulsion, however, and took the occasion to reaffirm party policy 
of excluding all believers from membership. 
Other similar interventions could be cited. One way to under­
stand the relationship between these interventions on the part of the 
LCY and the more usual federalized policy-making context is in terms 
of the distinction between basic decisions and routine decisions. 
Basic decisions involve long-range commitments, broad questions of 
fundamental direction, and, in the Yugoslav context, any questions of 
cadres policy. Such decisions are broad in scope , infrequent, and 
taken at the highest level; they are apt to be taken under duress or 
pressure. Routine decisions , by contrast , have little impact of 
consequence on the organization but contribute to the formation of the 
policy environment.30 They are generally taken at lower levels of the 
organization, affect narrowly defined issues of a specific nature , and 
are apt to be reversible. Routine decisions lie exclusively within 
the domain of the federal units. 
The Serbian Orthodox Church as Loyal Opposition 
While the Catholic Church and the Islamic community are in many 
ways as strong as ever, the Serbian Orthodox Church seems to be expe­
riencing a gradual decline. There are several tell-tale signs. 
First , secularization , as a natural process weaning believers from 
their faith , has hit the Serbian Church the hardest. A 1 9 8 2  opinion 
poll , reported in Ilustrovana politika , found that while a third of 
youth in traditionally Catholic regions are religious, the proportion 
in traditionally Serbian Orthodox regions is about three percent , 
while a 1 9 84 survey in the Ni� area (in Serbia ) found few real be­
lievers. 31 Second, the Serbian Orthodox Church has the least favora­
ble clergy/believer ratio of the three maj or denominations. For while 
there is one� for every 1 , 25 0 Yugoslav Muslims and one Catholic 
priest for every 2, 239 Catholics, there is orily one Serbian Orthodox 
priest for every 5 , 7 1 4  believers.32 Third , the Serbian Orthodox 
Church is the least organized of the three maj or religious bodies when 
it comes to religious instruction.33 Fourth , the Serbian Orthodox 
Church has been by and large less successful than the other religious 
organizations in obtaining permits to build new churches.34 And 
finally, the authorities keep a tighter rein on Serbian Church publi­
cations, requiring that every religious publication in Serbia be 
submitted for approval fifteen days before it is to appear in pub­
lic.35 This, of course, means that a daily or even a weekly publica-
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tion--possible for the Catholic Church in Slovenia and in Croatia , 
where prior approval is not required--would make little sense for the 
Serbian Orthodox Church. 
Seen in this light , it is not surprising that Pravoslavlje , the 
organ of the Belgrade Patriarchate, unlike its Catholic counterpart, 
Glas koncila, is a generally uncontroversial publication, content with 
commemorating the saints and discussing theological matters. Nor is 
it surprising, perhaps , that the current Serbian Patriarch , German , 
has taken pains to underline his loyalty to socialist Yugoslavia , 
observing at one point , "All of those who are opposed to a socialist 
Yugoslavia are also the opponents of the Serbian Church and are our 
enemies."36 
Still , Pravoslavlje does occcasionally speak out critically-­
usually in defense of Serbian national interests in the face of per­
ceived threats in the "borderlands." When the Croatian nationalist 
euphoria reached a crescendo in 1970-71 , the Serbian Orthodox Church 
was on hand to "defend" the Serbs from Croatian nationalism. When 
Kosovo , the ancient homeland of the Serbian people , exploded in Al­
banian-nationalist riots in 1981, Pravoslavlje issued an "Appeal for 
the Protection of the Serbian Inhabitants and their Shrines in Ko­
sovo."37 And throughout the period since the secession of the Mace­
danian Orthodox Church in 1 967, the Serbian hierarchy has interpreted 
its repudiation of Macedonian ecclesiastical autocephaly as a Serbian 
nationalist cause. 
In the late 1 9 50s and early 1 9 6 0s ,  the Serbian Orthodox Church 
felt it had a protector in Aleksandar Rankovic , Yugoslavia's vice 
president and head of the security police.38 When he fell from power 
in 1 9 6 6 , the Serbian Church felt it had lost its protector--a fear 
that seemed confirmed when the Macedonian clergy began to press for 
autocephaly four months later. Since that time, the Serbian hierarchy 
has found it difficult to escape the feeling that the Serbian Orthodox 
Church has been singled out b y  the authorities for discriminatory 
treatment.39 The Church continues to complain of interminable delays 
in the granting of permission to build new church edifices in Belgrade 
and Split , of the failure of authorities to honor an agreement to 
return sacred artifacts from the Zagreb historical museum , and of 
"conduct of certain governmental organs toward the Church (which] is 
not always in accord with the constitution."40 In spring 1 9 84 ,  a 
Serbian priest even complained that "in other republics religious 
people can be members of the party and send their children to reli­
gious instruction while here it is not allowed. "4 1  In other words , 
some Serbian clergy at any rate b elieve that the federalization of 
religious policy works against the Serbian Church. 
Yet Serbian Church difficulties should not be exaggerated. The 
! 
13 
Church has been able to open new churches both in Serbia and in other 
republics, for example at Tutnjevac in August 198 1 ,  at Nova Gradiska 
(in Croatia) in October 1 982, and at Jasenovac (Croatia) in September 
1 984, and local authorities at Celje (Slovenia) granted permission in 
1982 for the construction of a Serbian Orthodox Church to cater to the 
roughly 1 , 000 local Orthodox believers.42 In addition, the Serbian 
Orthodox Church laid the foundation stone for a new four-story theolo­
gical faculty in Belgrade , in May 1 9 84,  which, when completed, will 
accommodate two hundred students. The ceremonies were officiated by 
Patriach German and attended, inter alios, by various representatives 
of the Serbian government, the Serbian Academy of Sciences , and the 
University of Belgrade. 4 3  Finally , the Serbian Orthodox Church has 
maintained a lively publishing activity, of which it is justifiably 
proud, capping this recently with the publication of the first offi­
cial Orthodox Church translation of the New Testament into Serbo­
Croatian.44 Hence , when the secular press reports that relations 
between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the state are "generally 
good , "45 this is , in fact , generally accurate. At the same time , 
there is much lingering distrust on both sides. 
The Protestant Challenge 
The authorities have become accustomed to the three traditional 
religions of Yugoslavia (Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Islam), and vice 
versa. But the presence and proselytization of newer Protestant sects 
present a challenge to both--a challenge with which both the authori­
ties and the traditional religious organizations find it difficult to 
deal. 
The chief Protestant Churches in Yugoslavia are: the Reform"'d 
Christian Church, which caters largely to Hungarians in Vojvodina , 
with about 6 0 , 000 members; the Evangelical-Lutheran Churches , with 
72, 385 members (in 1976), many of them Vojvodinan Slovaks; the Pente­
costal Church, with 5 , 000 members; the Seventh-Day Adventists, with 
10, 600 members; the Baptist Church, with 3,500 members; the Methodist 
Church , with 3, 700 members; the Jehovah's Witnesses , with 1 0 , 000 
adherents; and the Church of the Brethren, with adherents in Serbia, 
Croatia, and Slovenia.46 
Of these, the Pentecostals, the Baptists, the Seventh-Day Adven­
tists, and the Jehovah's Witnesses have been the most active in prose­
lytizing. In fact , the Jehovah's Witnesries publish their Kula 
strazara (Watchtower) publication in more than 32, 000 copies: 14,000 
copies in (Latinic) Croatian , 8 , 000 in (Cyrillic) Serbian , 10, 000 in 
Slovenian , and an unspecified number in Macedonian. The Jehovah's 
Witnesses and the Adventists have been active in Serbia since at least 
the early 1 9 70s , when they started to try to win converts from the 
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Orthodox Church. Mija Milacic, a district party official, reported at 
the time that these Churches were 
insolently selling their publications through the mails. 
Baptist magazines are reaching some addresses on a COD 
basis. The Jehovah's Witnesses are distributing their lite­
rature in the villages of the Morava valley. The Seventh­
Day Adventists sell their publications to Serbian Orthodox 
folk at the church in the monastery of Ravanica4 Unpleasant scenes between the two groups frequently occur. 7 
Similar reports emerge periodically, and ''smaller Protestant communi­
ties" have been accused , in particular , of disrupting Catholic and 
Orthodox church services and of proselytizing on the grounds of Catho­
lic and Orthodox churches.48 
On the whole, the authorities seem to prefer to ignore the Prot­
estants. Intermittently, one may read passages, in the secular press, 
such as the following: 
The Adventist sect is active in many of our cities. [Adven­
tists] are very isolated and very dangerous. They are 
recognizable by the fact that they refuse to work or go to 
school on Saturdays or to carry weapons in the service. 
They pay money when they join the sect , and it is difficult 
to leave. They are dangerous because their children must 
also be members of the sect. They do not agree to any 
compromises, and they condemn every outside authority. They 
are exclu��vely against self-management and self-managing 
democracy. 
Because of their energetic proselytization, the Adventists and Jeho­
vah's Witnesses will probably remain anathema to the authorities in 
any of the federal units. Yet there have also been Protestant clergy 
who have achieved reputations for cooperativeness with the authori­
ties, such as Dr. Juraj Struharik,  Bishop of the Slovak Lutheran 
Church in Yugoslavia. 50 
Conclusion 
The argument has come full circle. I began by stressing the 
limits to the commonality of religious policy in Yugoslavia , high­
lighting different religious conditions and legislation in the repub­
lics, and the very substantial autonomy enjoyed by the latter. Now it 
seems that there are also limits to heterogeneity. These limits can 
be seen in the Marija Car case, and likewise in the general distrust 
with which authorities in any republic view certain neo-Protestant 
groups especially. 
There are other limits. Organization theory teaches that policy­
making in an organizational setting is conditioned by individual 
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motivations , associational group loyalties (e.g. , to Serbia , or 
Catholicism, or peasant farmers), and organizational �tructure, 5 1  and 
that decision-making should be viewed as the process of "drawing 
conclusions from premises."52 The latter equation traces decisions to 
processes of information-processing in which premises derived from 
party affiliation, regional con�erns , group loyalties ,  and person�!·· 
development affect the way in which information is received, manipu­
lated,  and acted upon. Moreover , information-processing cannot be 
disassociated from organizational structure, and one is entitled to 
posit that structurai commonalities will produce common policy procli­
vities and common decision-making dilemmas. Both organizational 
structure (which is very much the same from republic to republic) and 
basic premises set limits, therefore, on policy heterogeneity. 
The essay began with five questions about religious policy in 
Yugoslavia. On every score,  the question has been answered on the 
side of complexity. Religious policy in Yugoslavia is susceptible to 
the influence of considerations of policy in other realms, is worked 
out in a factionalized , federalized environment in which formally 
proclaimed "clear objectives" are often lost in a complex shuffle of 
intervening variables , and in part for these reasons is moderately 
heterogeneous across republics and across confessions. In approaching 
the subject matter, organization theory made sense of this complexity 
by differentiating between basic decisions and routine decisions, by 
linking decentralization to the reinforcement of the bifurcation of 
interests , and by stressing the importance of organizational struc­
ture, group loyalties, and operational premises in policy-making. 
At the same time , this essay has provided .a more particular 
vindication of the approach of James March and Herbert Simon , an 
approach referred to as behavioral organization theory. The impor­
tance of perception and group affiliation, which is borne out by the 
evidence , is nowhere stressed as much as in behavioral-organization 
theory, which, in general, seems better attuned, than other variants 
of organization theory , to the complexities of the Church-state dy­
namic in Yugoslavia. 
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